Jedes Semester wird das HGI-Kolloquium zu aktuellen Themen der IT-Sicherheit angeboten. Es wird von den Lehrstühlen des Institutes organisiert und ist für alle interessierten Personen offen, externe Gäste sind immer willkommen. Wenn Sie den HGI-Newsletter abonnieren, bekommen Sie die Vortragsankündigungen rechtzeitig per E-Mail.
Das Seminar findet in der Regel donnerstags um 12:00 Uhr im Gebäude ID auf Etage 03 in Raum 411 statt Wegbeschreibung.
Dieses Semester wird das Seminar von der Arbeitsgruppe für Sichere Hardware organisiert. Untenstehend finden Sie eine Liste der geplanten Termine und Vorträge für das ganze Semester. Falls nicht anders angekündigt, finden alle Vorträge um 12.00 Uhr s.t. statt.
|24.04.2014||Hoeteck Wee||RUB und ENS Paris||Cryptography, Encryption, and Big Data||03/463||12.00 Uhr|
|30.04.2014||Felix Gröbert||Security Analysis of Apple FileVault2||03/445||16.00 Uhr|
|13.05.2014||Prof. Martin Bossert||Universität Ulm||Cryptographic Procedures based on Algebraic Coding Theory||03/471||14.30 Uhr|
|21.05.2014||Mathias Bynens||Opera Software||Hacking with Unicode||03/445||16.00 Uhr|
|22.05.2014||Amir Herzberg, Haya Shulman||TU Darmstadt||The illusion of challenge-response authentication||03/463||12.00 Uhr|
|26.06.2014||Orr Dunkelmann||University of Haifa||When Cryptography is not the Answer (even when it is)||03/463||12.00 Uhr|
|30.06.2014||Yvo Desmedt||University of Texas||From Public Key Infrastructures to Secure Multiparty Computation||03/455||12.00 Uhr|
|04.07.2014||Jens-Peter Kaps||George Mason University||Flexible Open-source Setup for Side-channel Investigation and anaLysis (FOSSIL)||IC 03/112||11.00 Uhr|
|17.07.2014||Thomas Pöppelmann||Ruhr-Universität Bochum||Efficient Implementation of Ideal Lattice-Based Cryptography||03/463||13.00 Uhr|
Cryptography, Encryption, and Big Data
We live in an era of "Big Data", wherein a deluge of data is being generated, collected, and stored all around us. In order to protect this data, we need to encrypt it. This raises a fundamentally new challenge in cryptography: Can we encrypt data while enabling fine-grained access control and selective computation, as is necessary to protect big, complex data?
In this talk, I will present my work on functional encryption which addresses this challenge.
Security Analysis of Apple FileVault2
The talk will give an overview of the architecture of Apple's Mac OS X full disk encryption feature named FileVault2. We will evaluate the attack surface, show case bugs and discuss currently remaining attack vectors. We conclude with a recommendation for FileVault2 and pointers to further hardening avenues of the Mac OS X platform.
Cryptographic Procedures based on Algebraic Coding Theory
Crypto systems based on prime numbers are attacked by the quatum computer and the advances in number theory. In contrary, no attack is known yet for systems based on certain algebraic codes. An introduction to the McEliece system will be given. Also some advances in algebraic coding theory and their possible influence on crypto systems will be discussed.
Hacking with Unicode
The illusion of challenge-response authentication
Most Internet services and systems still rely on challenge-response defences for their security against attacks by off-path adversaries. We present recent techniques allowing to subvert standard and widely supported defences, and show how to facilitate them for DNS cache poisoning attacks. We propose short term countermeasures, preventing our attacks, however, we argue that in the long term, cryptographic defences should be deployed, providing security even against stronger man-in-the-middle adversaries. We review DNSSEC deployment and discuss challenges and obstacles.
When Cryptography is not the Answer (even when it is)
Since modern cryptography has emerged in the mid 70's, it developed a huge set of solutions to many of the security problems: from secure algorithms for communication, to identification of entities, from integrity assurance for programs, to methods for evaluating a function without revealing it.
Despite these advances, even the security challenges that were solved by cryptography are still affecting our everyday life: from using old and insecure algorithms, through key management issues, to problems in the interaction between the cryptography and the system where it resides.
In this talk we shall consider several examples of such issues, of the gaps between "what is already solved by cryptographers" and "what the security professionals see as unsolved (if not unsolvable)". We will try to isolate the sources for such problems, and look for the changes, both in the technical level and in the perception level, needed from both sides of the security equation (cryptographers and security professionals), to overcome these issues in the future.
From Public Key Infrastructures to Secure Multiparty Computation
Public Key Infrastructures (PKI) are a cornerstone in the protection of the internet, in particular electronic commerce. Already in 1996 the speaker pointed out the weakness of the currently implemented X500/X509. The hacking of DigiNotar confirmed the speaker's earlier predictions that Certifying Authorities would be hacked.
In this lecture, we explain how a solution proposed to make PKIs more secure against hackers lead to progress on Secure Multiparty Computation. Secure Multiparty Computation allows parties to compute a function in such a way that nothing leaks more to the parties than what follows logically from the output.
This lecture is accessible to a large audience not familiar with information security.
Bio: Yvo Desmedt is the Jonsson Distinguished Professor at the University of Texas at Dallas, chair at the University College London and a Fellow of the International Association of Cryptologic Research (IACR). He received his Ph.D. (1984, Summa cum Laude) from the University of Leuven, Belgium. He received the IBM Belgium Prize for best PhD in Computer Science that year. He held positions at: Universite de Montreal, University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee (founding director of the Center for Cryptography, Computer and Network Security), and Florida State University (Director of the Laboratory of Security and Assurance in Information Technology, an NSA Center of Excellence since 2000). He has held visiting appointments at AIST (Japan), Macquarie University (Australia), Technion (Israel), Tokyo Institute of Technology (Japan), University of Karlsruhe (Germany), among others. He is an (associate) editor of The Journal of Computer Security and Editor-in-Chief of IET Information Security and Chair of the Steering Committees of CANS and ICITS. He was Program Chair of e.g., Crypto 1994, the ACM Workshop on Scientific Aspects of Cyber Terrorism 2002, and ISC 2013. He has authored over 200 refereed papers, primarily on cryptography, computer security, and network security. He has made important predictions, such as his 1983 technical description how cyber could be used to attack control systems (realized by Stuxnet), his 1986 prediction computer viruses will one day attack the chip design (luckily not yet fulfilled), and his 2001 prediction hackers will target Certifying Authorities (DigiNotar was targeted in 2011).
Flexible Open-source Setup for Side-channel Investigation and anaLysis (FOSSIL)
Side-channel analysis attacks pose a growing threat to implementations of cryptographic algorithms implemented in software as well as in hardware. Current standard side-channel evaluation boards with Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), that allow for exploring the vulnerability of cryptographic implementations on FPGAs, are expensive and available only for a few FPGA devices. Furthermore, a complete open source software package that includes drivers that run test cases on the board, control the measurement equipment, and contain several side-channel analysis techniques is not readily available. Each user has to assemble their own setup based on software packages from multiple sources, written in multiple languages and write parts themselves. This complexity and cost makes it also very difficult, if not impossible, to educate students on side-channel analysis through hands-on laboratory exercises. We introduced an open-source side-channel analysis system for FPGAs, at the work in progress session of COSADE 2012 and Cryptarchi 2013 which features support for multiple FPGA devices and includes all necessary software to run differential power analysis attacks, which are the most prominent kind of side-channel attacks. The components are build in a modular fashion so that it can easily be adapted for new FPGA boards, oscilloscopes, and attack techniques. It was met with a lot of interest from universities and research groups. Since then we have improved multiple parts of the system including a complete rewrite of the analysis software in Python and support for clock generation. Furthermore, it integrates with the low cost OpenADC board to form a complete low-cost SCA solution for less than $200, which will be ideal for educational use. At the end of this month FOSSIL will be released.
Efficient Implementation of Ideal Lattice-Based Cryptography
Novel public-key cryptosystems beyond RSA and ECC are urgently required to ensure long-term security in the era of quantum computing. One alternative to such established schemes is ideal lattice-based cryptography which offers elegant security reductions and versatile tools such as the ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem. In this talk we will give an overview on current research dealing with the implementation and optimization of efficient ideal lattice-based cryptography on reconfigurable hardware and other platforms. Basic building blocks we will deal with are the number theoretic transform (NTT) for fast polynomial multiplication and discrete Gaussian sampling. Especially the NTT is very efficient on reconfigurable hardware and several works have improved the state-of-the art so far. At the end of the talk we will discuss some open problems and challenges in this emerging field of research.
Inhalte des Vortrags werden bald bekannt gegeben.